

Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 18 December

2019

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These are the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 18 December 2019.

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The Bank of England Act 1998 gives the Bank of England operational responsibility for setting monetary policy to meet the Government’s inflation target. Operational decisions are taken by the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. The minutes of the Committee meeting ending on 29 January will be published on 30 January 2020.

# Monetary Policy Summary, December 2019

The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) sets monetary policy to meet the 2% inflation target, and in a way that helps to sustain growth and employment. At its meeting ending on 18 December 2019, the MPC voted by a majority of 7-2 to maintain Bank Rate at 0.75%. The Committee voted unanimously to maintain the stock of sterling non-financial investment-grade corporate bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at £10 billion. The Committee also voted unanimously to maintain the stock of UK government bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at £435 billion.

The Committee’s latest projections for activity and inflation were set out in the November *Monetary Policy Report* and were based on the assumption of an orderly transition to a deep free trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union. UK GDP growth was projected to pick up from current below- potential rates, supported by the reduction of Brexit-related uncertainties, an easing of fiscal policy and a modest recovery in global growth. With demand growth outstripping the subdued pace of supply growth, excess demand and domestic inflationary pressures were expected to build gradually. CPI inflation was projected to rise to slightly above the 2% target towards the end of the forecast period.

Since the MPC’s previous meeting, economic data have been broadly in line with the November *Report*. Global growth has shown tentative signs of stabilising and global financial conditions remain supportive. The partial

de-escalation of the US-China trade war provides some additional support to the outlook relative to the November *Report*, although trade tensions remain elevated.

UK GDP increased by 0.3% in 2019 Q3 and is expected to rise only marginally in Q4. Household consumption has continued to grow steadily, but business investment and export orders have remained weak. Financial markets have remained sensitive to domestic policy developments. Since the November *Report*, the sterling exchange rate has appreciated by 2% and UK-focused equities have outperformed their international counterparts. There is no evidence yet about the extent to which policy uncertainties among companies and households have declined.

There continue to be some signs that the labour market is loosening, although it remains tight. Employment growth has slowed and vacancies have fallen, but the unemployment rate has remained stable and the employment rate is around its record high. Although pay growth has eased somewhat, unit labour costs have continued to grow at rates above those consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term. CPI inflation remained at 1.5% in November and core CPI inflation remained at 1.7%, broadly as expected. The headline rate is still expected to fall to around 1¼% by the spring, owing to the temporary effects of falls in regulated energy and water prices.

Monetary policy could respond in either direction to changes in the economic outlook in order to ensure a sustainable return of inflation to the 2% target. The Committee will, among other factors, continue to monitor closely the responses of companies and households to Brexit developments as well as the prospects for a recovery in global growth. If global growth fails to stabilise or if Brexit uncertainties remain entrenched, monetary policy may need to reinforce the expected recovery in UK GDP growth and inflation. Further ahead, provided these risks do not materialise and the economy recovers broadly in line with the MPC’s latest projections, some modest tightening of policy, at a gradual pace and to a limited extent, may be needed to maintain inflation sustainably at the target.

The MPC judges at this meeting that the existing stance of monetary policy is appropriate.

# Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 18 December 2019

1. Before turning to its immediate policy decision, the Committee discussed: monetary and financial conditions; the international economy; demand, output, money and credit; and supply, costs and prices.

## Monetary and financial conditions

1. The main financial market news since the November *Monetary Policy Report* had been a 2% increase in the sterling effective exchange rate index and an 8½% increase in UK-focused equity prices. Sterling had appreciated both in the weeks before the general election and immediately afterwards, although it had subsequently fallen back somewhat. Sterling implied volatilities had fallen, indicating a reduction in market participants’ uncertainty about the future path of the exchange rate. UK-focused equity prices had increased prior to, and particularly immediately after, the election. The share prices of utilities companies had increased, as had those of most UK banks.
2. Domestic policy developments had had less impact on sterling interest rates. Market contacts did not expect any change in monetary policy at this MPC meeting, and the expected path for short-term rates over the next year had been little changed since the November *Report*. The instantaneous forward Overnight Index Swap curve continued to indicate that market participants placed more weight on a cut in Bank Rate than an increase over the next year. Further out, the expected path for Bank Rate was a little higher than the 15-day average on which the November *Report* projections had been conditioned, by around 10 basis points in three years’ time. Ten-year gilt yields had risen by a similar amount.
3. Medium-term measures of UK inflation compensation, such as the five-year inflation swap rate, five years forward, had been little changed since the November *Report*. Since the autumn of 2018, those rates had also been broadly unchanged, while the equivalent measures in the United States and euro area had fallen markedly. At the longer end of the curve, UK market-implied inflation rates had fallen in line with international peers. As a result, the UK forward inflation curve had, unusually, been inverted.
4. The Committee discussed a range of possible explanations for these moves. Longer-term UK inflation compensation measures may have been affected by expectations of future changes to the calculation method of the Retail Prices Index, and, as suggested by market intelligence, a reduction in the demand for longer-term inflation swaps from pension funds. The fact that longer-term measures had moved in line internationally also suggested some role for global factors. Market contacts had pointed to concerns about a low inflation environment in the United States and particularly the euro area, although it was less obvious that this was a factor for the United Kingdom. Actual and prospective changes in the exchange rate had appeared to be a key driver of movements in UK shorter-term inflation compensation. Overall, it was hard to distinguish the precise roles of each of these factors in accounting for recent movements at different points on the forward curve. Taken together with the evidence from surveys of households and businesses, the Committee judged that inflation expectations remained well anchored.
5. UK bank funding costs had been little changed since November, although there had continued to be a slight tightening in corporate credit conditions. Household mortgage rates had continued to edge down.
6. Short and longer-term interest rates in the United States and euro area had been little changed since the Committee’s previous meeting. The US Federal Open Market Committee had left the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged on 11 December. The ECB Governing Council had also left policy unchanged at its December meeting.
7. Since the November *Report*, the Euro Stoxx equity index had increased by around 4% and the S&P 500 by around 6%, after the United States and China had agreed a phase one trade deal. Investment-grade and high-yield corporate bond spreads had fallen, and had remained below their post-crisis averages.

## The international economy

1. UK-weighted global GDP had grown broadly in line with expectations at the time of the November *Monetary Policy Report*. More timely indicators tentatively suggested that, after slowing over the past two years, global growth had bottomed out in the fourth quarter. The JP Morgan global manufacturing PMI had continued to improve in November and was now in expansionary territory, and the services PMI had picked up slightly in November as well. The new export orders component remained weak and in contractionary territory, however.
2. The broader weakness in global activity had partly reflected the impact of trade tensions. Since the November *Report*, the United States and China had agreed a phase one deal in which a new round of planned tariffs due to be implemented on 15 December would not now go ahead, and some previously implemented tariffs would be reduced. However, the announcement of new US tariffs on goods from Brazil, Argentina and France, as well as the apparent breakdown in the WTO’s appellate body, had continued to add to trade uncertainty.
3. Euro-area GDP growth in 2019 Q3 had been 0.2%, in line with the previous release and with the forecast in the November *Report*. Growth was expected to continue at a similarly modest rate over the next couple of quarters, consistent with PMIs having remained subdued in December. There was little evidence that activity would deteriorate much further, however. The slowdown in growth in the euro area since 2017 had been accounted for disproportionately by Germany, where the latest indicators had been mixed. German industrial production had continued to decline in November, whereas exports, in particular to other euro-area economies, had picked up over recent months.
4. US GDP growth had been 0.5% in 2019 Q3, unrevised from the advance estimate. Incoming data suggested stable growth in Q4. Strength in the household sector had been mirrored in the labour market, with the increase in non-farm payrolls in November higher than expected, at over 250,000, and the unemployment rate having reached a historical low of 3.5%. Investment had remained weak, however.
5. The People’s Bank of China had cut key lending rates since the November *Report*, and fiscal policy decisions announced earlier in the year had supported activity. Despite this support, growth in mainland China was expected to continue to slow to below 6% into 2020 and 2021, in line with the projections in the November *Report*. In Hong Kong, political tensions had contributed to the sharpest fall in economic activity since the global financial crisis.
6. On balance, GDP growth for the major emerging markets had been slightly stronger than expected, at 0.8% in 2019 Q3. A further increase in quarterly growth to 0.9% in Q4 was expected, reflecting in part the pickup in the services PMI for three of the largest emerging economies as well as support from monetary policy easing earlier in the year. The broad-based weakness in manufacturing PMIs had continued in November, however.
7. Spot oil prices had risen significantly, by 13% since the November *Report*, reflecting in part OPEC’s latest agreed cut in production, as well as recent developments in global trade policy. Changes in the prices of other commodities had been smaller.
8. Consumer price inflation in major advanced economies had remained subdued, despite a pickup in labour cost growth. Wage inflation in the euro area had risen from an average of 1.6% in 2016 to 2.5% in 2019 Q3. Productivity growth over that period was estimated to have been weak relative to its long-run average and so unit labour cost growth had also picked up. Euro-area core HICP inflation had averaged 0.8% in 2016 and had remained close to 1% since then. In November, core inflation had increased to 1.3%, although that increase had in part appeared to reflect a new method for calculating the German package holiday price index.
9. Growth in the US Employment Cost Index measure of wages and salaries had picked up from 2.3% on average in 2016 to 2.9% in 2019 Q3. Over that same period, productivity growth was estimated to have remained weak relative to its long-run average and so unit labour cost growth had risen too. Core PCE inflation had eased further in October to 1.6%, however, and was now back to the same level it had averaged over 2016.

## Demand, output, money and credit

1. UK GDP had risen by 0.3% in 2019 Q3, a little weaker than had been expected at the time of the November *Monetary Policy Report*. Monthly GDP had been flat in October and growth on a year earlier had been the weakest since June 2012. Within that, construction output had fallen by over 2% on the month, accounted for by weakness in the subcomponents for private housing and total infrastructure. Construction data were often volatile and had previously been subject to greater revision than data for other sectors of the economy, however. Service-sector and manufacturing output had risen by 0.2% in October.
2. Indicators of GDP growth based on business surveys had continued to point to flat or slightly contracting output in 2019 Q4. The IHS/Markit composite output PMI had fallen in November and the flash estimate for December had declined further, while the expectations index had risen slightly in both months. The CBI composite output balance had fallen marginally in November and, although the composite expectations balance

had increased, it had remained lower than during the first half of 2019. The output volume balances in the CBI’s monthly Industrial Trends Survey had fallen back in December.

1. Taking the latest official data and business surveys together, Bank staff expected GDP growth of 0.1% in 2019 Q4, slightly weaker than the MPC had expected in the November *Report*. The news largely reflected the weakness of construction output in October, although Bank staff judged that it may have recovered to some extent later in the quarter. The outlook for GDP growth in the first half of 2020 would depend significantly on how uncertainty evolved, including following recent domestic policy developments.
2. Business investment had been flat in 2019 Q3, following a 0.4% decline in Q2 and, before that, a decline of 1.6% in the year to 2019 Q1. Survey evidence suggested companies’ investment decisions had been motivated by the replacement of the existing capital stock more than by spending to expand capacity or increase efficiency. Investment intention surveys had remained weak and over half of the respondents to the Decision Maker Panel had continued to view Brexit as one of the top three sources of uncertainty. Responses to a new question in the Bank’s Agents’ Brexit survey had suggested that some investment plans put on hold since the EU referendum could be reinstated by the end of next year, although only a relatively small number of respondents had answered this question.
3. Export volumes had risen in October, accounted for particularly by a 7% increase in goods exports to the European Union. Import volumes had also grown strongly, including goods imported from the European Union. Those movements appeared in part to have reflected some renewed stock-building by companies in both the United Kingdom and overseas ahead of the end-October Brexit deadline, and was consistent with evidence from manufacturing output data and from business surveys. The latest episode of stock-building appeared to have been on a smaller scale than that observed in the run-up to the earlier end-March Brexit deadline. It would probably unwind before the end of the quarter, however, and would therefore be broadly neutral for quarterly GDP growth. Underlying growth in exports had remained weak, according to surveys of export orders.
4. Household consumption had grown by 0.4% in 2019 Q3 and retail sales volumes had increased by 0.2% in the three months to October. Other spending indicators had also continued to point to steady consumption growth, of around 0.3% in Q4. Mortgage approvals for house purchase had weakened slightly in October, although most indicators were consistent with a small rise in house prices in Q4. Following recent upward revisions to the household saving ratio, the ONS had subsequently signalled that the ratio could be revised down. It nevertheless remained the case that narrower measures of real household labour income growth had outstripped the growth of consumer spending over recent quarters.

## Supply, costs and prices

1. There continued to be some signs that the labour market was loosening, although it remained tight. The unemployment rate had remained at 3.8% in the three months to October, a little lower than anticipated, and the Committee expected that it would be broadly flat over the next few months. There was also little sign of a loosening labour market in the Q3 data on job separations or job finding rates, the latter of which had risen to their highest level since the financial crisis.
2. However, both official employment growth and survey indicators had been softening for some time, suggesting some decline in labour demand. LFS employment had increased by only 0.1% in the three months to October, although this had been 0.3 percentage points stronger than expected in the November *Monetary Policy Report*. The number of vacancies had fallen quite sharply, but the fall in the ratio of vacancies to unemployment had been less pronounced.
3. As GDP growth had slowed, a small margin of excess supply had appeared to open up. That slack was judged to lie mainly within companies, consistent with weakness in some survey measures of capacity utilisation as well as with the range of evidence that suggested that the labour market had remained tight. It was nevertheless unusual for slack to have increased without a rise in the unemployment rate. Another possibility was that potential productivity and hence supply growth had weakened over this period, which would imply less spare capacity within companies and a smaller margin of excess supply in the economy. The Committee would return to these issues as part of its annual supply stock-take ahead of the next *Report*.
4. Having picked up over the summer, earnings growth had fallen back in recent months. Growth in private sector average weekly earnings (AWE) excluding bonuses in the three months to October had been 3.5%, 0.4 percentage points lower than projected in the November *Report*, and below its peak of 4.0% in June and July. It appeared likely that this recent softening had primarily reflected the unwind of a previous temporary boost. For example, there was evidence that compositional effects, related to factors including the skills, industry and occupational mix of the workforce, had pushed up on pay growth over that earlier period.
5. The Committee expected that private sector regular earnings growth would remain close to 3½% in the near term, although pay surveys, including from the REC, and reports from the Bank’s Agents, suggested a downside risk to that profile. Thereafter, the outlook for pay growth would depend on the extent of labour market loosening.
6. Since productivity had remained roughly flat, labour cost-based measures of domestically generated inflation had fallen back alongside pay. The growth rate of unit labour costs had declined to 3.6% in the year to 2019 Q3, although it had remained above the level consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term.
7. Twelve-month CPI inflation had been unchanged at 1.5% in November, broadly as expected in the November *Report* and the lowest rate since November 2016. That had followed a fall of 0.2 percentage points in October, which had been accounted for by a reduction in the contribution to inflation from utility prices, as previously announced cuts to Ofgem’s price caps had come into effect. Core CPI inflation, which excluded energy, food, alcoholic beverages and tobacco, had also been unchanged in November, at 1.7%. Core services CPI inflation, by contrast, had fallen to 2.3% and the same measure excluding rents had also fallen, to 2.7%.
8. CPI inflation was expected to rise slightly in the first quarter of next year before falling back to around 1¼% in 2020 Q2, the latter owing to the temporary effect of falls in regulated energy and water prices, as well as the recent appreciation of sterling. Core CPI inflation was expected to be more stable, although still somewhat subdued, at around 1¾% in the second quarter of next year.
9. Measures of households’ inflation expectations had fallen a little at shorter horizons, with mixed evidence at longer horizons. According to the latest Bank of England/TNS Inflation Attitudes Survey, inflation expectations one year ahead had edged down, and this had been supported by evidence from other household surveys. Expectations five years ahead in the Bank/TNS survey, however, had picked up to above their historical average, although other surveys of households’ longer-run expectations had been more subdued. There had been no new data on corporate inflation expectations since the Committee’s previous meeting.

## The immediate policy decision

1. The MPC sets monetary policy to meet the 2% inflation target, and in a way that helps to sustain growth and employment. In pursuing that objective, the main challenges the Committee faced had been to assess the economic implications of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union against a backdrop, more recently, of weaker global growth, and to identify the appropriate policy response to that changing outlook. That outlook depended significantly on the nature and timing of EU withdrawal, in particular: the form of new trading arrangements between the European Union and the United Kingdom; whether the transition to them was abrupt or smooth; and how households, businesses and financial markets responded. The implications for the appropriate path of monetary policy would depend on the balance of the effects on demand, supply and the exchange rate.
2. The Committee’s latest projections for activity and inflation had been set out in the November *Monetary Policy Report* and had been based on the assumption of an orderly transition to a deep free trade agreement between the United Kingdom and the European Union. UK GDP growth had been projected to pick up from current below-potential rates, supported by the reduction of Brexit-related uncertainties, an easing of fiscal policy and a modest recovery in global growth. With demand growth outstripping the subdued pace of supply growth, excess demand and domestic inflationary pressures had been expected to build gradually. CPI inflation had been projected to rise to slightly above the 2% target towards the end of the forecast period.
3. The Committee reviewed developments since its previous meeting and the extent to which they had been in line with the projections in the November *Report*. In particular, the discussions centred around: the prospects for a recovery in global growth; the responses of financial markets, companies and households to recent and prospective domestic policy developments; and the extent to which the UK labour market was loosening.
4. Global growth had shown tentative signs of stabilising. UK-weighted global GDP had risen by 0.4% in 2019 Q3, slightly weaker than during the first half of this year but in line with the rates recorded in 2018 H2. GDP growth in 2019 Q4 was likely to come out slightly stronger than had been expected in the November *Report* in the United States and across emerging market economies, and broadly in line elsewhere. More timely indicators of the global trade and manufacturing cycle had been mixed to date, however. Despite recent weakness in business investment, the US labour market appeared to have remained robust, while euro-area unemployment had stabilised at its lowest rate since 2008.
5. Past global monetary policy stimulus appeared to be gaining traction and global financial conditions had remained supportive. Equity indices and government bond yields in major advanced economies had risen from their troughs in the autumn. The partial de-escalation of the US-China trade war would provide some additional support to the outlook relative to the November *Report*, although trade tensions remained elevated.
6. UK GDP had increased by 0.3% in 2019 Q3 and was expected to rise by only 0.1% in Q4, both slightly weaker than expected at the time of the November *Report*. The news in the fourth quarter largely reflected the weakness of the construction sector in October, which may prove temporary. Business surveys, all of which had been conducted prior to the general election, had continued to point to flat or slightly contracting GDP in 2019 Q4. Within those, indicators of current output had generally fallen further, while most expectations series had risen slightly. Household consumption appeared to have continued to grow steadily during the second half of this year, but business investment and export orders had remained weak.
7. Financial markets had remained sensitive to domestic policy developments. Since the November *Report*, the sterling exchange rate had appreciated by 2% and UK-focused equities had outperformed their international counterparts. The expected path for Bank Rate in three years’ time was around 10 basis points higher than the 15-day average on which the November *Report* projections had been conditioned. These movements probably reflected a perceived reduction in tail risks around the Brexit process as well as an updated judgement among market participants about the likely central outcome.
8. Sterling implied volatilities had fallen back materially, including relative to implied volatilities in other currencies. As well as indicating a reduction in market participants’ uncertainty about the future path of the exchange rate, this could also indicate a reduction in the drag on activity from wider uncertainties facing the UK economy, as implied volatilities had historically had some predictive power for forecasting GDP and investment growth. Taken at face value, these movements were also consistent with the scale of the near-term fall in uncertainty that had been assumed at the time of the November *Report*.
9. More broadly, there was no evidence yet about the extent to which policy uncertainties among companies and households had declined following recent domestic policy developments. Initial information on that would become available early next year, including from business and consumer confidence surveys, the Bank’s Agency network and the Decision Maker Panel. Given that the EU Withdrawal Agreement was now widely expected to be ratified before the end-January deadline, it was possible that household and business sentiment could pick up in the near term. Further out, the responses of companies and households would depend on developments in the next stage of the Brexit process, including negotiations about the nature of, and the

transition to, the United Kingdom’s future trading relationships.

1. All else equal, recent asset price movements implied tighter financial conditions and thus a weaker medium-term outlook for growth and inflation. The appreciation of the exchange rate and a small increase in interest rates would outweigh the boost from risky asset prices that would push down on companies’ weighted average cost of capital. These movements should not be viewed in isolation, however, and it would be important to undertake a full reassessment of the outlook ahead of the next *Report*, including the extent to which households and businesses appeared to be responding positively to recent developments.
2. There continued to be some signs that the labour market was loosening, although it remained tight. Employment growth had slowed and vacancies had fallen, but the unemployment rate had remained stable and the employment rate was around its record high.
3. Despite the stability of the unemployment rate, a small margin of excess supply had nevertheless appeared to open up in the wider economy. That slack was judged to lie mainly within companies, consistent with weakness in some survey measures of capacity utilisation and reflecting the assumption that there had been little deterioration in potential productivity growth relative to recent years. The Committee would re- examine these judgements as part of its annual supply stock-take ahead of the next *Report*.
4. Although pay growth had eased somewhat, this appeared to have reflected primarily the unwind of a previous temporary boost. Regular annual AWE growth was now around 3½% compared with around 4% during the middle of this year. Unit labour costs had nevertheless continued to grow at rates above those consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term.
5. Headline and core CPI inflation had both been unchanged in November, at 1.5% and 1.7% respectively, broadly as expected in the November *Report*. The headline rate was still expected to fall to around 1¼% by the spring, owing to the temporary effects of falls in regulated energy and water prices. Excluding rents, core services CPI inflation had remained at rates consistent with meeting the inflation target in the medium term, although that measure had fallen back in November. The Committee judged that inflation expectations remained well anchored.
6. The Committee turned to its immediate policy decision.
7. Monetary policy could respond in either direction to changes in the economic outlook in order to ensure a sustainable return of inflation to the 2% target. The Committee would, among other factors, continue to monitor closely the responses of companies and households to Brexit developments as well as the prospects for a recovery in global growth. If global growth failed to stabilise or if Brexit uncertainties remained entrenched, monetary policy might need to reinforce the expected recovery in UK GDP growth and inflation. Further ahead, provided these risks did not materialise and the economy recovered broadly in line with the MPC’s latest projections, some modest tightening of policy, at a gradual pace and to a limited extent, might be needed to maintain inflation sustainably at the target.
8. For the majority of members of the Committee, the existing stance of monetary policy was appropriate at this meeting. Economic data since the MPC’s previous meeting had been broadly in line with the November *Report*. In that forecast, GDP growth had been expected to remain below potential in the near term but to rise above it next spring, given the assumed combined support from lower uncertainty, easier fiscal policy and somewhat stronger global growth. The biggest news since November had been on global trade and domestic

policy developments, but it was too early to judge how material that would prove to be for the economic outlook. The labour market had remained tight and domestically generated inflationary pressures had remained relatively firm.

1. Two members preferred a loosening of policy at this meeting. The economy had been a little softer than expected, and there was a modest but rising amount of spare capacity. Core inflation was subdued. Employment growth was slowing and seemed likely to weaken further given trends in vacancies and firms’ hiring intentions. Downside risks remained to the MPC’s projections from a weaker world outlook and Brexit uncertainties. With relatively limited space to cut Bank Rate, risk management considerations favoured a prompt response to downside risks at present in order to ensure a sustained return of inflation to the target.
2. The Governor invited the Committee to vote on the propositions that: Bank Rate should be maintained at 0.75%;

The Bank of England should maintain the stock of sterling non-financial investment-grade corporate bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at £10 billion;

The Bank of England should maintain the stock of UK government bond purchases, financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, at £435 billion.

Regarding Bank Rate, seven members of the Committee (Mark Carney, Ben Broadbent, Jon Cunliffe, Andrew Haldane, Dave Ramsden, Silvana Tenreyro and Gertjan Vlieghe) voted in favour of the proposition. Two members (Jonathan Haskel and Michael Saunders) voted against the proposition, preferring to reduce Bank Rate by 25 basis points.

Regarding the stock of purchased assets, the Committee voted unanimously in favour of the second and third propositions.

1. The following members of the Committee were present:

Mark Carney, Chair Ben Broadbent

Jon Cunliffe Andrew Haldane Jonathan Haskel Dave Ramsden Michael Saunders Silvana Tenreyro Gertjan Vlieghe

Clare Lombardelli was present as the Treasury representative.

As permitted under the Bank of England Act 1998, as amended by the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016, Bradley Fried was present on 13 and 16 December as an observer for the purpose of exercising oversight functions in his role as a member of the Bank’s Court of Directors.